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A general model of a group search procedure, applied to epistemic democracy 
 
Christopher Thompson 
 
(Forthcoming in: Synthese (Special Issue on the Epistemology of 
Inclusiveness).  23 February 2012 draft. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The standard epistemic justification for inclusiveness in political decision making is 
the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which states that the probability of a correct decision 
using majority rule increases in group size (given certain assumptions).  Informally, 
majority rule acts as a mechanism to pool the information contained in the judgements 
of individual agents.  I aim to extend the explanation of how groups of political agents 
track the truth.  Before agents can pool the information, they first need to find truth-
conducive information.  Increasing group size is also important in the initial search for 
truth-conducive information. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
At least some political decisions are of the kind that can be correct or incorrect.  If it 
is the case that groups of political agents are more reliable at making correct decisions 
than individual agents, then this can provide strong epistemic grounds for widening 
the democratic franchise.  Majority voting and the Condorcet Jury Theorem play a 
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prominent role in most current accounts of epistemic democracy.  Informally, 
judgement aggregation procedures such as majority voting serve as mechanisms to 
pool the truth-conducive information contained in the judgements of individual 
agents.  The literature on the Condorcet Jury Theorem is already quite developed, and 
in this paper I mostly rehearse the main points.  But what has largely been overlooked 
in the current literature is how political agents obtain truth-conducive information in 
the first place.   
 
A small but interesting philosophical literature on search procedures has developed 
quite recently.  Various authors have developed models of group search which, inter 
alia, consider the search behaviour of agents and the group composition which is 
epistemically optimal.  I draw out the two types of social epistemic mechanism that 
allow groups of agents to be more successful in searches than individual agents.  I 
show why it is the case that increasing the size of the group can increase the 
probability that an object of search will be found.   
 
The epistemic justification for widening the democratic franchise can be expanded 
into a two-staged process.  Firstly, agents engage in a search procedure to extract 
truth-conducive information from the environment.  Increasing the size of the group 
increases the amount of information obtained by members of the group.  Secondly, 
aggregation procedures such as majority voting allow the group to pool the 
information obtained by individual agents.  Increasing the size of the group increases 
the amount of information contained in the social choice.   
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2. Judgement aggregation procedures 
 
Some political decisions are about matters of fact.  For example, whether a nation 
possesses nuclear weapons or not, which form of power generation has the lowest 
costs and which presidential candidate has the policies that will create the most jobs 
are all questions which have correct and incorrect answers.  Propositions which 
describe possible states of the world are termed 'alternatives'.  Possible alternatives 
might include, for example ‘that the nation in question does possess nuclear 
weapons’, ‘that the nation in question does not possess nuclear weapons’; ‘wind 
power is cheapest’, ‘coal power is cheapest’, ‘nuclear power is cheapest’, ‘gas power 
is cheapest’; ‘the Republican presidential candidate will create the most jobs’ and ‘the 
Democratic presidential candidate will create the most jobs’.  To help interpret the 
votes of agents we often have an agenda which contains a specific set of alternatives.  
The agenda is common knowledge for all relevant parties.  An agenda might contain a 
complete logical partition of possible states of the world such as ‘that the nation in 
question does possess nuclear weapons’/ ‘that the nation in question does not possess 
nuclear weapons’.  It is possible that the agenda only contains some of the possible 
alternatives, for example ‘wind power is cheapest’/ ‘coal power is cheapest’.  If the 
agenda only contains some of the possible alternatives then there is a risk that the 
correct alternative is not included.  In what follows we assume that the agenda is 
comprised of two alternatives, and that only one of these alternatives is correct (only 
one of the propositions accurately describes the true state of the world)i.   
 
A political decision requires decision makers which are termed 'agents'.  Each agent 
(or voter, or juror) can express their judgement as to what they think the actual state 
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of the world is, as to what they think the correct alternative is.  Agents express their 
judgement by casting votes for particular alternatives.  An aggregation procedure 
allows a group to generate a collective judgement (or social choice) which depends on 
the judgements of individual group members.  It can be construed as “…a function 
which assigns to each combination of individual judgements across the group 
members a corresponding set of collective judgements” (List, 2008, p.289). 
     
Figure 1: aggregation procedures (List, 2008, p.298) 
     
     
 
    
 
 
There are a variety of different aggregation procedures including (but not limited to) 
dictatorship, unanimity rule and majority rule.  With dictatorship, the social choice is 
just the judgement of the single agent who is deemed the dictator.  With unanimity 
rule, an alternative will be the social choice if and only if it receives the votes of all 
the agents.  With majority rule, an alternative will be the social choice if and only if it 
receives strictly more than half of all the votes.  These three aggregation procedures 
are particularly salient, and often feature in the literature on epistemic aspects of 
social choice theoryii.  Each aggregation procedure has different virtues, but the focus 
of this paper is the epistemic virtue, the probability that an aggregation procedure will 
select the correct alternative (and avoid the wrong alternativeiii) as the social choice.   
 
Input (individual judgements) 
Aggregation procedure 
Output (collective judgement) 
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Majority rule is the default democratic aggregation procedure.  May’s theorem shows 
that in a pairwise choice majority rule is the only aggregation procedure that satisfies 
the four important procedural virtues of universal domain, neutrality, anonymity and 
positive responsivenessiv.  Majority rule also has important epistemic virtues.  The 
epistemic potential of majority rule as a judgement aggregation procedure is 
supported by the classic Condorcet Jury Theoremv (CJT).  The classic CJT applies to 
social choice problems in which simple majority voting is used to determine the social 
choice when there are two alternatives on an agenda, one of which is objectively 
correct.   
 
The CJT has two assumptions: 
 
• Competence: the probability that agents will vote for the correct alternative is 
homogeneous, greater than a half and less than certainty.  
• Independence: the events of any two agents voting for the correct alternative 
are independent, conditional on the state of the world.  
 
The classic CJT result comes in two parts: 
 
• Non-asymptotic CJT: the probability that the group will select the correct 
alternative is monotonically increasing as the group size increases;  
• Asymptotic CJT: in the limit as group size tends towards infinity, the 
probability of a correct majority verdict tends towards certainty.   
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The probability of a correct majority verdict ( ) is as followsvi: 
 
 
 
where  is the homogeneous level of competence and  is the size of the group. 
 
We can see the effect of increasing group size in the figure below.  Here, the 
homogeneous competence level is  and agents are independent.   
 
Figure 2: the probability of a correct majority verdict as group size increases.   
 
 
 
There have been various extensions of the classic CJT, two of which are of particular 
significance.  Theorem V of Grofman et al. (1983) extends the CJT to heterogeneous 
competencies, where the average competence level is greater than a half and the 
distribution of competencies of the group members is symmetric.  List and Goodin 
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(2001) extend the CJT from majority rule on a two-placed agenda, to plurality rule on 
a many-placed agenda.   
 
It should be noted that the ability of the judgement aggregation procedure of majority 
rule to track the truth goes beyond the limited conditions of the CJT and its 
extensions.  For example, there will be some cases where the distribution of 
competence levels in a group is not symmetric about the mean.  Nevertheless the 
probability of a correct majority verdict may be greater than the competence level of 
any single member of the group and may in fact be close to certainty.  Similarly, there 
may be cases where the independence assumption of the CJT is violated and yet the 
probability of a correct majority verdict is extremely high.  However, if the two 
assumptions of the CJT are not met increasing group size is not always epistemically 
virtuous, we have no general rule for determining the epistemic impact of increasing 
group size and instead we need to rely on sample calculations. For example, a group 
with competencies  has a probability of a correct majority 
verdict of .  If we are concerned with making the correct social 
choice then in this case it would have been better to make agent 3 the dictator, and 
ignore the votes of the other two agents.  However a group with competencies  
 has a probability of a correct majority 
verdict of .  By employing majority rule this group of five 
agents is more reliable than any individual group member.  
 
How are we to account for the epistemic power of majority rule?  Formal proofs of 
the asymptotic CJT have been published elsewherevii.  Here I will present two 
informal explanations for why majority rule can be successful at tracking the truth.  
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Firstly, majority rule has a tolerance for mistaken, incorrect votes.  With the 
judgement aggregation procedures of dictatorship or unanimity rule, if a single agent 
makes the mistake of voting for the incorrect alternative, the correct alternative will 
not be the social choice.  By contrast, with majority rule the mistaken votes of a 
minority of agents can be off-set by the correct votes of the majority.  If the 
competence assumption of the CJT holds then as group size increases it becomes 
increasingly likely that there will be more votes for the correct alternative than for the 
incorrect alternative (in line with the law of large numbers).  Suppose, for example, 
that the group was comprised of one agent with competence .  This agent has 
a 0.4 probability of making a mistake and voting for the incorrect alternative.  
However if we increase the group size to three agents with competencies 
 and employ majority rule, then when one agent makes the 
mistake of voting for the wrong alternative, their error can be compensated for by the 
correct votes of the other two agents.  Under majority rule, the correct alternative will 
still be the social choice even if any one of the three agents makes a mistake and votes 
for the incorrect alternative.  The probability of correct majority decision, given the 
competencies in this group, is . 
 
The trade-off between correct and incorrect votes can only occur if there is some 
diversity in the voting behaviour of agents.  The diversity in voting behaviour by 
agents is captured by the independence assumption of the CJT.  If agents were 
entirely dependent, and voted identically, then there would be no epistemic advantage 
to increasing group size.  For majority rule to track the truth as group size increases, it 
must be possible for an agent to vote correctly if another agent votes incorrectly.   
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The second informal explanation for the truth-tracking ability of majority rule is that 
judgement aggregation procedures, like majority rule, act as information pooling 
mechanisms.  As Ladha, 1992, states: “…the majority-rule mechanism is simply a 
means to aggregate the experts’ opinions and thereby their information… when the 
assumptions of the CJT are met, majority rule voting serves as a mechanism to 
assimilate decentralised information about the alternatives.” (p.619)viii.  Each agent 
has an incomplete view of the state of the world.  By combining these incomplete 
views, the group is able to pull together a complete view of the true state of the world.   
 
If majority rule is to pool the information contained in the judgements of individual 
agents, it must be the case that the judgements contain some truth-conducive 
information.  The competence of agents, , represents the probability of the event that 
agents vote for the one correct alternative on a two-placed agenda.  If an agent had no 
information whatsoever as to which alternative on the agenda is correct, and is simply 
casting a vote at random, then he or she will have a competence of .  If an 
agent is to have a competence level better-than-random, this agent needs to receive a 
truth-conducive piece of information which makes him or her more likely to vote for 
the correct alternative than the incorrect alternative.  The competence of this agent, 
given the true state of the world and some truth-conducive information, will be 
.ix   
 
The competence assumption of the classic CJT can be weakened – it does not have to 
be the case that each agent receives a piece of information such that the competence 
levels of all agents in the group are identical.  It is sufficient for each agent to receive 
information of differing truth-conducive strengths such that the average competence 
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level is greater than ½, and the competencies of group members are symmetrically 
distributedx.   
 
The independence assumption of the classic CJT requires that the vote of one agent 
(for the correct or incorrect alternative) makes it neither more nor less likely that 
another agent votes for the correct or incorrect alternative.  If agents have the same 
piece of truth-conducive information in common, then the independence assumption 
will be violated.  The fact that one agent votes correctly will make it more likely that 
another agent will votes correctly (since the common piece of information serves as a 
common causal factor on their votes).  If agents have no information in common, then 
the vote of one agent should make it neither more nor less likely that another agent 
will vote correctly.  The independence assumption of the CJT requires that as each 
new agent is added to the group, the agent brings with them entirely new pieces of 
truth-conducive information.   
 
It may be possible to weaken the independence assumption of the classic CJT.  Ladha 
(1992) and Estlund (1994) each consider the impact of violations of the independence 
assumption, of shared information and correlated votes.  Ladha argues that the 
probability a majority verdict is correct is inversely related to the average of the 
coefficients of correlation.  In other words, if some of the information which 
generates the competence levels of agents (and which is pooled by the aggregation 
procedure of majority rule) is held in common between agents, then the probability of 
a correct majority verdict will be lower.  However, provided that agents have at least 
some private truth-conducive information (provided the votes of agents are not 
entirely dependent) there may be epistemic advantage to increasing the size of the 
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group.  Estlund argues that the presence of common influences does not easily rule 
independence in or out, and in fact deference to more competent opinion leaders can 
be epistemically virtuous.   
 
In sum, if majority rule is to track the truth as group size increases, the agents added 
to the group need to bring with them new pieces of information.  But agents do not 
have this information a priori.  Current epistemic accounts of democratic decision 
making, which rely on majority rule and the CJT, only start part way through the 
process.  The current accounts show how information contained in the judgements of 
agents is pooled into the social choice, but the current accounts are silent on how 
agents obtain this information.  To complete the epistemic account of democratic 
decision making we need an account of how agents extract information from the 
environment in the first place.   
 
Increasing group size is epistemically virtuous for the judgement aggregation 
procedure of majority rule, provided that agents are minimally competent (as per the 
CJT competence assumption) and provided there is some diversity in the voting 
behaviour of agents (as per the CJT independence assumption).  In particular it must 
be possible for an agent to vote correctly when another agent votes incorrectly, so that 
the correct votes can off-set the minority of incorrect votes.  Increasing group size 
may also be important in the search for information.  As with the aggregation 
procedure of majority rule the success of a group at finding truth-conducive 
information may rely on differences in the behaviour of agents.  With the judgement 
aggregation procedure of majority rule, it is differences in the voting behaviour of 
agents that is important.  With search procedures, it may be differences in way agents 
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search for information that makes increasing group size epistemically virtuous.  If 
there are some differences in the search behaviour of agents, then the failure of one 
agent to find a piece of information can be compensated for by another agent.    
 
3. Group search procedures 
 
A search procedure can be construed as a function which assigns to each agent a 
corresponding set of objects.  Individual agents have their own search procedure.  A 
group’s search procedure is comprised of the search procedures of the individual 
agents in the group and the success of a group at finding objects depends on the 
success of the individual search procedures.  A group search procedure allocates 
subsets of objects from the total search space to individual members of the group. 
 
Figure 3: search procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The idea of a search procedure should be familiar.  Suppose you are writing a paper 
on Wittgenstein.  You need to find the specific passage where Wittgenstein states that 
we perceive a proposition as a picture.  To find the quote you need to engage in a 
search – to move from one possible location of the quote to the next, to see if that is 
where the quote is located.  Suppose you have looked through the Tractatus and the 
Input (agents, objects) 
Output (agent\ object groupings) 
Search procedures 
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Philosophical Investigations, but just can’t find the passage you are looking for.  Your 
chances of finding the quote will be improved if you email your colleagues asking for 
help.  Provided your colleagues have at least some chance of finding the quote 
(provided they are familiar with the Tractatus and Philosophical investigations) and 
provided there are some differences in the way they search for the quote, then as the 
number of people searching for the quote increases, the chances that at least one 
person will find the quote for you should increase.   
 
There are two possible mechanisms that can account for the success of the group 
search procedure.  Firstly, given time constraints, it may not be possible for you or 
any of your colleagues to search every possible location for the quote.  You may only 
have enough time to search points 1 and 2 of the Tractatus.  Your colleague may only 
have enough time to search points 2, 3 and 4 of the Tractatus.  Provided that there is 
some diversity in the locations visited by agents, then as the number of agents 
increases, the total number of locations visited increases and the probability that 
someone finds the quote increases.  In the limit, all possible locations for the quote 
will be visited by at least one agent and the quote is certain to be found.  I term this 
type of group search procedure a ‘spatial search procedure’. 
 
The second possible mechanism that can account for the success of the group search 
procedure is that each agent might be fallible at recognising the quote when they visit 
the location of the quote.  Suppose you read point 4.012xi but fail to take in its 
significance.  A colleague also reads point 4.012 but fails to take in its significance.  
Provided that there is some diversity in the ability of the different agents to recognise 
the quote, then as the number of agents visiting the location of the quote increases, the 
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chance that at least someone will recognise the quote and take in its significance 
increases.  In the limit, someone is bound to recognise the quote eventually.  I term 
this type of group search procedure a ‘search recognition procedure’.   
 
A small but interesting philosophical literature on search procedures has developed 
quite recently.  Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) provide a spatial search model to 
investigate the division of cognitive labour in communities of scientists working in 
the same research field.  Weisberg and Muldoon consider ‘control’ agents, who ignore 
the research of other agents, ‘follower’ agents, who move towards the research of 
other agents, and ‘maverick’ agents, who move away from the research of other 
agents.  Using Netlogo computer simulations, Weisberg and Muldoon show that 
where the make-up of the group is homogeneousxii, the proportion of the search space 
explored by the group increases as the size of the group increases.  Importantly, they 
also show how it is epistemically desirable, from the groups’ perspective, to have a 
mixture of ‘maverick’ and ‘follower’ agents in the search for successful approaches to 
particular scientific research topics.  The maverick agents strike out on their own, 
away from the research of others, to find research areas of epistemic significance.  
Follower agents move towards the discoveries of other agents and help fully explore 
the areas of epistemic significance identified by maverick agents.  Although the 
authors focus on the spatial aspect of search (‘exploration’ in their terminology), they 
also point to a search recognition aspect to the division of scientific cognitive 
labourxiii.   
 
Hong and Page (2004) also produce a spatial model of group search behaviour.  
Through proofs and computer simulations they show that ‘diversity trumps ability’, 
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that a group with varied but sub-optimal search heuristics will outperform a group 
with optimal but similar search heuristics.  The intuition behind their surprising result 
is roughly that the more varied a set of search heuristics, the more thoroughly a search 
space will be investigated and the more likely it is that the objects of interest (or 
‘solutions’) will be identified. 
 
List et al. (2008) produce a model of nest site selection by hives of honey bees.  Their 
model combines aspects of a spatial search procedure, search recognition procedure 
and judgement aggregation procedure.  List et al. stress the important interplay 
between interdependence and independence in the search behaviour of the bees.  The 
bees need to be interdependent in their spatial search: a honey bee is more likely to 
visit a potential nest site if the location of that site is communicated to them by other 
bees.  If the judgements of honey bees regarding the best nest sites are independent, 
then they will contribute new information to the group.   
 
I will now articulate, in more precise terms, the two different types of search 
procedure: the spatial search procedure and the search recognition procedure.  I 
present these as conjectures.  Franz Dietrich helped me correctly formulate these 
conjectures.   
 
Suppose we have a set of objects which are the subject of search.  The objects of 
search might be the statements by Wittgenstein that compare propositions to pictures, 
or the objects might be truth-conducive pieces of information that indicate which 
presidential candidate will generate the most jobs. We have a finite set of locations 
where the object might occur.  For example, the Wittgenstein quote could occur 
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anywhere between points 1 and 7 of the Tractatus (or alternatively anywhere between 
page 1 and page 111 of the Tractatus).  The information indicating which presidential 
candidate is best might be located in speeches given by candidates, or in press 
releases, or in articles written by commentators.  The set of locations can be divided 
into jointly exhaustive (though perhaps not exclusive) subsets of locations.  Each of 
these subsets of locations is visited by a different agent.   
 
Each object of search occurs at a particular locationxiv.  The mapping from the set of 
all objects to the set of locations is - initially - unknown to agents in the group.  If an 
agent moves to the location of an object the agent will have a certain probability of 
recognising that object.   
 
We will consider the special case in which there is just one object which is the subject 
of searchxv.  If we can show that the probability of finding one particular object 
increases with group size, and it is the case that the ability to find objects is similar for 
all other objects, then it follows that as the size of the group increases the total 
number of objects found by the group increases.  The location of the object and the 
subset of locations in which it  occurs are initially unknown to the group.  Each agent 
is assigned one subset of locations.  Being assigned a subset of locations means that 
an agent visits each location in that subset as part of their search for the object.  Once 
the agent moves to a location in their subset of locations, they attempt to identify the 
objects located there.   
 
I will begin by presenting the search conjectures separately, before providing a 
combined conjecture.   
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Spatial Search Conjecture 
Initially we will assume that each agent has an infallible ability to recognise an object 
if they visit the location of that object.  For example, if an agent visits location 4.012 
of the Tractatus, the agent is certain to recognise that this contains the quote the group 
is searching for.  If the object occurs in the subset of locations visited by an agent it 
will be found by that agent.   
 
We have two further assumptions, as follows: 
 
Spatial Search Competence: For each agent, the unconditional probability that the 
object occurs in the subset of locations searched by an agent is uniformly bounded 
away from zero and is less than certainty.  
  
Spatial Search Independence: The events of the object occurring in the subsets of 
locations searched by different agents are independent. 
 
The probability that a member of a group of  agents finds an object of 
interest: 
• (non-limit claim) increasing in group size ; and 
• (limit claim) in the limit approaches certainty. 
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If   is the event that agent  finds the object and  is the probability that some 
member of a group of  agents finds the object, then: 
  
 
 
The Spatial Search Competence assumption of the Spatial Search Conjecture allows 
for agents in the search group to have heterogeneous probabilities of finding the 
object of search.  The independence assumption in the spatial search conjecture 
reflects the need for there to be some differences or diversity in the way in which 
agents move around the search space looking for the object.  If all agents visited 
exactly the same locations, then there would be no epistemic advantage to increasing 
the size of the group.  The independence assumption reflects a neutral interpretation 
of the diversity in search behaviour.  This assumption can be both strengthened and 
weakened.  The strongest requirement for diversity in the spatial search behaviour of 
agents is as follows:   
 
Spatial Search Diversity: For any two agents the events of the two agents visiting the 
location of the object are mutually exclusive.  No agents have any locations in 
common and so it is impossible for two agents to find the object.   
 
Of course the assumption that the sets of locations visited by agents are exclusive is 
quite demanding.  If this assumption were to hold in practice, then it would require 
either a social planner to divide up the search space into non-overlapping subsets of 
locations; or it would require agents to communicate in the partitioning of the search 
space.   
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The Spatial Search Diversity assumption can be weakened.  We can allow that there is 
some overlap in the locations visited by agents and therefore that the probabilities of 
different agents finding the objects are not independent.  The minimum amount of 
private search we require from agents can be characterised as follows: 
 
Spatial Search Diversity 2: Although the intersection in the set of locations searched 
by two agents may be non-empty, each agent has at least some locations that they 
search privately.   
 
Search Recognition Conjecture 
Here we assume that each agent in the group is certain to visit the location of the 
object of search, but agents have a less than perfect ability to recognise the object 
located there.  For example, agents would be guaranteed to visit location 4.012 of the 
Tractatus, but agents are not guaranteed to recognise the significance of the quote 
there.   
 
We have two further assumptions as follows:   
 
Search Recognition Competence: The conditional probability that an agent recognises 
the object, given the object is in the set of locations searched by the agent, is 
uniformly bounded away from zero and less than certainty.   
 
Search Recognition Independence: The events of different agents recognising the 
object, given that they visit the object’s location, are independent. 
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The conditional probability that one of a group of agents recognises the object, given 
the object is in the set of common locations visited by the agents, is: 
• (limit claim) increasing in group size ; and  
• (non-limit claim) in the limit tends to certainty. 
  
We write  for the event that agent  recognises the object, given the agent visits 
the object’s location.  The conditional probability that a group of  agents recognises 
the object at a particular location, , is given by: 
 
 
 
There may be some violations of Search Recognition Independence.  An agent’s 
ability to recognise objects could be caused by any number of factors.  For example, 
an agent’s ability to recognise Wittgenstein’s quotes could be caused by the seminars 
or tutorials they attended which focussed on particular aspects of Wittgenstein’s work.  
If two agents share some recognition ability generating factors (if, for example, they 
attended the same seminars) then their recognition abilities will not be independent.  
The probability of an agent recognising an object, given that their colleague has 
recognised the object, will be greater than the agent’s unconditional probability of 
recognising the object.  However independence in object recognition ability is secured 
by conditionalising on common factors as follows: 
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Search Recognition Independence 2:  The events of different agents recognising the 
object are independent, conditional on the object being contained in the common set 
of locations and on factors held in common between agents.   
 
 
Combined Search Conjecture 
We can combine the two conjectures.  If the Spatial Search Competence, Spatial 
Search Independence, Search Recognition Competence and Search Recognition 
Independence assumptions hold then the unconditional probability that one of a group 
of agents finds the object: 
• (limit claim) increasing in group size ; and  
• (non-limit claim) in the limit tends to certainty. 
  
The probability that a group of  agents recognises the object at a particular location, 
, is given by: 
 
 
The two mechanisms driving the epistemic performance of the Combined Search 
Conjecture are, firstly, that different agents visit different locations (Spatial Search 
Conjecture); and, secondly, that different agents visit the same location but have 
differing abilities to recognise the object located there (Search Recognition 
Conjecture).  These two mechanisms pull in different directions.  If we encourage 
agents to disperse and visit different locations we decrease the probability that the 
objects at those locations will be recognised.  If instead we encourage agents to visit 
the same locations we increase the probability the objects at that particular location 
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will be recognised, but we decrease the probability of finding objects that occur at 
different locations.   
 
There are similarities in the mechanisms that account for the epistemic success of the 
two search procedures and the judgement aggregation procedure of majority rule.  A 
single agent may fail to find the object of search.  However provided that agents have 
some capacity to search for the objects (as per the search competence assumptions) 
and provided there are some differences in the search behaviour of agents (as per the 
search independence and diversity assumptions), then the new agents added to the 
group can compensate for failure of other agents to find the object. 
 
Simulations 
The search procedures were reproduced in the computer program NetLogo 4.1xvi.  The 
assumptions of the search conjectures were satisfied and the model was tested to see if 
it confirmed the conjectures.  Following the NetLogo conventions, the search space 
(set of all possible locationsxvii) is represented in a two dimensional x and y tortoidal 
grid.  The grid is 37 locations wide and 37 locations tall meaning that there are a total 
of 1369 locations in the search space.  Each agent is placed at a random starting 
location and then moves from location to location according to a search heuristic.  For 
example an agent’s search heuristic may require the agent to rotate a random number 
of degrees to the right, and then move forward one location.  Each simulation lasts 
100 agent moves.   
 
Firstly, I present the simulation results for the Spatial Search Conjecture where both 
the Spatial Search Competence and Spatial Search Independence assumptions hold.  
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Secondly, I present sample calculations for the Search Recognition Conjecture.  
Finally I present simulation results for the Combined Search Conjecture.   
 
In each simulation model the number of agents in the group was varied.  The 
experimental result is the proportion of locations visited at the end of the 100 
movesxviii.  The object of interest could occur on any one of the 1369 locations.  In the 
limit, if all the locations are visited, the object of interest is guaranteed to be found.  
Therefore as the proportion of locations visited by a group of agents increases the 
probability that the object will be found also increases.   
 
For the sake of illustration, a screen shot of the first simulation model is seen in the 
figure below.  Here ten agents were placed on the search space at random locations.  
The agents employed their search heuristic for 100 movements.  The paths the agents 
took through the search space have been traced and the locations visited by agents 
change from grey to black.   
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Figure 4: a screen shot of the NetLogo simulation. 
 
 
To assess the Spatial Search Conjecture in isolation, agents were placed at random 
start points on the search space.  Here the Spatial Search Competence assumption 
holds since each agent in the group is placed on a location in the search space and any 
of these locations could contain the object of interest.  Each agent in the group 
employs the same type of search heuristic whereby they rotate a random number of 
degrees to the right before moving forward one location.  There is no restriction on 
agents exploring locations also visited by other agents, thus the Spatial Search 
Independence assumption holds.  As can be seen in the figures below, the probability 
that an agent in the group will visit the location of the object (and by assumption find 
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the object) is increasing and in the limit tends towards certainty.  This simulation 
provides confirmation for the Spatial Search Conjecture. 
 
Figure 5: a graph of the simulation results for the Spatial Search Conjecture 
 
 
 
 
 
We now assess the Search Recognition Theorem in isolation via sample calculations.  
Here, to isolate the effect of additional agents on the probability of recognising the 
objects at particular locations, we assume that all the agents have reached the same 
location.  Agents have a  probability of recognising the object if they 
move to that object’s location – this is consistent with the Search Recognition 
Competence assumption.  The events of agents recognising the object are 
independent, in line with the Search Recognition Independence assumption.   
 
Proportion of locations visited 
Group size  
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Figure 6: a graph of sample calculation results for the Search Recognition 
Conjecture. 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen, as group size increases, the probability that a member of the group 
recognises the object also increases.  These sample calculations confirm the Search 
Recognition Conjecture.  The main result to take away from these sample calculations 
is that even when recognition competence is low and even when the number of agents 
is small, the probability that at least one member of the group recognises the object 
will be high.  Even when agents only have a 5% chance of recognising the object, if 
50 agents visit that same location there is a better than 90% chance than at least one of 
the agents will recognise the object.   
 
Finally I present the results of a simulation that models the Combined Search 
Conjecture.  Here the start point of agents are determined randomly.  Each agent in 
Group size  
 
Probability that the object is recognised 
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the group employs the same type of search heuristic whereby they rotate a random 
number of degrees to the right before moving forward one location.  Spatial Search 
Competence holds under these circumstances.  There is no restriction on agents 
exploring locations also visited by other agents.  As such, Spatial Search 
Independence holds.  We set agents level of recognition competence to 0.05 (and so 
Search Recognition Competence holds)xix.  Finally, Search Recognition Independence 
holds since the event of one agent recognising the object makes it neither more nor 
less likely that another agent will recognise the object.   
 
Figure 7: a graph of simulation results for the combined Search Conjecture   
(recognition competence ). 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen in figure 7, as group size increases the probability that the object is 
found by at least one agent is increasing and tends towards certainty.  This simulation 
result is in line with the Combined Search Conjecture.   
Probability that the object is found 
Group size  
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4. Linking search and aggregation procedures 
 
The discussion of search procedures in the previous section was general in nature.  
The two procedures of spatial search and search recognition could be applied to the 
search for any type of object, including tangible objects like a set of car keys you lost 
at home, and informational objects such as a Wittgenstein quote you cannot locate.  
The two search procedures can also be applied in a judgement aggregation 
framework.  Recall that judgement aggregation procedures such as majority rule can 
only pool the information contained in the judgements of individual agents if in fact 
the judgements do contain some truth-conducive information.  The competence of 
agents, , represents the probability of the event that agents vote for the one correct 
alternative on a two-placed agenda.  If an agent has no information whatsoever as to 
which alternative on the agenda is correct, and is simply casting a vote at random, 
then he or she will have a competence of .  If an agent is to have a competence 
level better-than-random, this agent needs to receive a truth-conducive piece of 
information which makes him or her more likely to vote for the correct alternative 
than the incorrect alternative.  The competence of this agent, given the true state of 
the world and some truth-conducive information, will be . 
 
I will argue for a two-staged process for truth-tracking in groups of political agents.  
Firstly, there are search procedures by which agents extract truth-conducive 
information from the environment.  Secondly, there are aggregation procedures (such 
as majority rule) which pool the information, dispersed across agents, into the social 
choice.  Increasing group size is epistemically virtuous in each stage (given certain 
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assumptions).  During a search procedure, increasing group size increases the amount 
of information found by agents.  During an aggregation procedure, increasing group 
size increases the amount of information pooled into the social choice.  The success of 
both the search procedures and the aggregation procedure rely on agents having a 
minimum level of ‘competence’xx and there being some diversity in the behaviour of 
agents.  For an aggregation procedure such as majority rule, there must be at least 
some chance of an agent voting correctly in the event of another agent voting 
incorrectly.  For the search procedures there must be at least chance of an agent 
finding a piece of information in the event that another agent fails to find it.  We can 
see a summary of the two-staged process in the figure below. 
 
Figure 8: a two-staged process for truth-tracking in groups of political agents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Input (agents, objects) 
Output (agent\ object groupings) 
Search procedures 
Input (individual judgements) 
Aggregation procedure 
Output (collective judgement) 
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Consider the case in which, for the sake of argument, there is a consensus that the 
correct presidential choice is the candidate who will create the most jobs and where it 
is a matter of fact that one of the candidate will create more jobs than the other.  The 
social choice (the candidate selected to be President) will be determined by majority 
rule.  If the competence level of the agents (the voters) is to be better-than-random, if 
agents are more likely to vote for the correct than incorrect candidate, the agents need 
to receive some truth-conducive piece of information.  If the votes of agents are to be 
independent, the agents need to receive different pieces of information.  One such 
piece of truth-conducive information might be the fact that, as a state governor, one of 
the candidates presided over a period of job creation.  A different piece of truth-
conducive information might be the fact that candidates from a particular party have 
tended to have a stronger record of economic management than the other party.  Each 
of these pieces of information may have a location.  They may be located in manifesto 
documents, in speeches given by candidates, or in the assessments presented by 
pundits on news programmes.  The more of this information captured by agents, and 
pooled into the social choice, the more likely the social choice is to be correct.   
 
There may simply be too much truth-conducive information, indicative of the best 
presidential candidate for creating jobs, for a single agent to collect.  Here we rely on 
a large number of voters to find the truth-conducive information in the first place, 
before sharing it with the group via their judgements.  Firstly, it may be the case that 
several agents watch the same speech given by a candidate.  However, the agents will 
not all pay attention to the same material in the speech.  Agent’s different capacities to 
recognise truth-conducive pieces of information mean that if one of the agents misses 
the part of the speech where the candidate talks of their success at creating jobs as a 
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Governor, another agent may pick up this statement.  Secondly, it may be the case that 
the agents do not have the time to pay attention to all the potential sources of truth-
conducive information.  If one voter listens to the candidate speeches, while another 
reads manifesto documents, then a truth-conducive piece of information missed by 
one agent may be picked up by another agent.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I will conclude by pointing to two issues with the two-staged framework I propose, of 
search procedures followed by aggregation procedures, which mean that widening the 
democratic franchise is not always epistemically virtuous.   
 
Firstly, the classic CJT only gives a conditional epistemic justification to widening the 
democratic franchise.  The classic CJT states that if the competence and independence 
assumptions hold, then the probability of a correct majority verdict is increasing in 
group size and in the limit tends to certainty.  If, on the other hand, the votes of agents 
are entirely dependent then increasing the size of the group will not increase the 
probability of a correct majority verdict.  Even worse, if the probability of agents 
voting for the correct alternative on a two-placed agenda (their competence level) is 
less than ½ then as the size of the group increases the probability of a correct majority 
verdict decreases and tends to zeroxxi.   
 
The competence and independence assumptions of the CJT will only be fulfilled if 
agents receive different pieces of truth-conducive information.  For the agents to 
receive different pieces of truth-conducive information two conditions must be met.  
32 
 
Firstly, agents need to engage in a search for information (and the conditions of the 
search conjectures must be met).  Secondly, the locations that agents search must 
contain some truth-conducive information.  If there is no truth-conducive information 
to find then, post-search, agents will have no idea which of the two alternatives on the 
agenda is correct and their probability of voting for the correct alternative will remain 
at .  If the locations searched by agents contain misleading pieces of 
information then by engaging in a search the agents become less likely to vote for the 
correct alternative.  For example, it may be the case that a particular presidential 
election race is so polluted by misinformation that in searching for information before 
agents cast their votes the agents actually become less informed.  There are three 
ways of addressing the problem of misleading information in the two-staged 
framework of search followed by aggregation.  Firstly, the search recognition 
competence of agents could be expanded to include sensitivity to misleading 
informationxxii.  The revised search recognition competence of agents is then the 
probability that an agent recognises that a piece of information is relevant and that the 
information is truth-conducive (non-misleading), given that the agent moves to the 
location of the information.  However, as Dietrich (2008) notes, a piece of 
information is misleading if it points to the incorrect alternative on the agenda.  To 
know if a piece of information is misleading, we would need to know what the correct 
alternative is.  But, by assumption, agents do not know what the correct alternative on 
the agenda is – that is why we are having a social choice exercise in the first place.  
So agents will simply be incapable of detecting whether a piece of information is 
misleading or not.  A second approach to addressing the problem of misleading 
information is to limit the number of agents engaging in the search for information, so 
as to limit the amount of misleading information pooled into the social choice.  
33 
 
However, to be in a position to make the institutional decision to limit the group’s 
search for information we would need to have at least some idea of which 
environments contain truth-conducive information and which environments are likely 
to be polluted with misleading information.  Again, this may not always be an easy 
task.  Finally, we could acknowledge that the possibility of misleading information 
really does pose a problem for epistemic justifications for widening the democratic 
franchise.  As Dietrich and List (2004) provexxiii, the possibility of misleading 
information may mean that the maximum probability of a correct majority verdict is 
not certainty (as per the standard CJT) but rather a value much less than certainty.   
 
The second of the two issues with the two-staged framework of search procedures 
followed by aggregation procedures is that the group’s social choice is most likely to 
be correct if the judgement aggregation procedure employed by the group is sensitive 
to the post-search distribution of information across group members.  If each agent 
has found some (different) truth-conducive information such that their competence 
levels are greater than ½, then majority rule may be the optimal voting rule.  
However, it is possible that the search space only contains a small pocket of truth-
conducive information.  Post-search it may be the case that almost all agents in the 
group have found no information and have a competence level of ½.  A minority of 
agents may have found the truth-conducive information and have a competence level 
greater than ½.  It may be epistemically advisable to increase the size of the group 
searching for information, so that we increase the chances that isolated pockets of 
information will be found by the group.  However, it will be epistemically advisable 
to restrict the number of agents permitted to express their judgement to those agents 
with certain levels of competence.  In some cases, if the competence level of agents is 
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transparent, it may be epistemically optimal to employ a form of oligarchy such as 
expert dictatorship.  Widening the democratic franchise is not always epistemically 
advisable.   
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I am grateful for the input from Richard Bradley, Christian List and Franz Dietrich.  
Franz Dietrich, in particular, provided important guidance in formulating the search 
conjectures.  Ryan Muldoon provided helpful comments on an earlier version of this 
paper.  I would also like to thank the anonymous referee for their suggestions.  
Versions of this paper were presented to the LSE Choice Group and the 3rd 
Copenhagen Conference in Epistemology: Epistemic Inclusiveness and Trust.   
 
References 
 
Bradley, R. and Thompson, C. (forthcoming, 2012) ‘A (Mainly Epistemic) Case for 
Multiple-Vote Majority Rule’, Episteme. 
 
Dietrich, F. and List, C. (2004) ‘A Model of Jury Decisions Where all Jurors Have the 
Same Evidence’, Synthese (special section: knowledge, rationality and action), 
142(2): 175-202. 
 
35 
 
Dietrich, F. (2008) ‘The Premises of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem are not 
Simultaneously Justified’, Episteme, 5(1): 56-73. 
 
Dietrich, F. and Spiekermann, K. (unpublished 2010a), ‘Epistemic Democracy with 
Defensible Premises’.  
 
Dietrich, F. and Spiekermann, K. (unpublished 2010b), ‘Independent Opinions?’. 
 
Estlund, D.M. (1994) ‘Opinion Leaders, Independence and Condorcet’s Jury 
Theorem’, Theory and Decision, 35(2): 131-162. 
 
Estlund, D.M. (2008) Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, N.J. 
 
Grofman, B., Owen, G. and Feld, S.L. (1983) ‘Thirteen Theorems in Search of the 
Truth’, Theory and Decision, 15(3): 261-278. 
 
Hong, L and Page, S.E. (1994) ‘Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers can Outperform 
Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers’, Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 101(46): 16385-16389. 
 
Ladha, K. (1992), ‘Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, Free Speech and Correlated Votes’, 
American Journal of Political Sciences, 36: 617-634. 
 
36 
 
List, C. and Goodin, R.E. (2001) ‘Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet 
Jury Theorem’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 9(3): 277-306. 
 
List, C. (2008) ‘Distributed cognition: a perspective from social choice theory’ in 
Albert, M. and Schmidtchen, D. and Voigt, S., (eds.) Scientific competition: theory 
and policy. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, pp. 285-308. 
 
List, C., Elsholtz, C. and Seeley, T.D. (2008) ‘Independence and Interdependence in 
Collective Decision Making: An Agent-Based Model of Nest-Site Choice by 
Honeybee Swarms’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 364(1518): 755-762. 
 
May, K. O. (1952) ‘A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for 
simple majority decisions’, Econometrica, 20(4): 680–684  
 
Owen, G., Grofman, B. and Feld, S.L. (1989) ‘Proving a Distribution-Free 
Generalization of the Condorcet Jury Theorem’, Mathematical Social Sciences, 17: 1-
16. 
 
Weisberg, M. and Muldoon, R. (2009) ‘Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of 
Cognitive Labour’, Philosophy of Science , 76(2): 225-252. 
 
Wilensky, U. (1999) NetLogo. http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/. Centre for 
Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modelling, Northwestern University. 
Evanston, IL.  
 
37 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (1922) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner and co. Ltd.  
 
 
 
                                                
i This is equivalent to there being one correct alternative on the agenda, with the other alternative on the 
agenda being a disjunction of anything not the correct alternative.   
ii See, for example, List (2008) and Bradley and Thompson (2012). 
iii I will also assume that the positive and negative reliabilities of agents are identical, that agents are 
just as able to correctly identify that a proposition is false as they are to correctly identify that a 
proposition is true. 
iv May (1952). Universal domain means that any possible combination of votes are acceptable as 
inputs; neutrality means that the two alternatives on the agenda are treated equally, they each require 
strictly more than half of the votes to be the winner; anonymity treats all agents equally, each vote 
carries equal weight; positive responsiveness means that if the winning alternative x receives exactly 
one more vote than alternative not-x, and one agent were to change his or her vote from x to not-x, then 
alternative not-x would now be the winner.  
v See, for example, Grofman, Owen and Feld (1983) Theorem I. 
vi Owen, Grofman, and Feld (1989). 
vii See, for example, Lahda (1992) and Dietrich (2008).  I am unaware of any published proof of the full 
monotonic non-asymptotic CJT, but Dietrich and Spiekermann (2010a) includes such a proof.  The 
CJT result relies on the law of large numbers, and is often explained by analogy with a sequence of 
coin tosses.  See, for example, List and Goodin (2001) and Estlund (2008).   
viii Similarly, Young (1995) states:  “Condorcet showed that, if the voters make their choices 
independently, then the laws of probability imply that the choice with the most votes is the one most 
likely to be correct. In other words, majority rule is a statistically optimal method for pooling 
individual judgments about a question of fact.” (p.52-53) 
ix It is also possible that an agent receives a misleading piece of information which will make the agent 
less likely to vote for the correct alternative (more likely to vote for the incorrect alternative).  Here, the 
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competence of the agent in question will be .  For a more detailed taxonomy of the causal 
influences on an agent’s vote (including informational causes) see Dietrich (2008). 
x Grofman, Owen and Feld (1983) Theorem V.  
xi “It is obvious that we perceive a proposition of the form aRb as a picture. Here the sign is obviously a 
likeness of the signified.” Wittgenstein (1922). 
xii Groups comprised solely of control agents, of follow agents or of maverick agents. 
xiii Weisberg and Muldoon assume that if an agent discovers a significant scientific approach, the agent 
will be successful at fully exploiting its potential (making the important discoveries, getting the papers 
published).  However, if the agents are not guaranteed to fully exploit the potential of a particular 
scientific approach then there may be group epistemic gains to be had from many agents following the 
same approach.   
xiv For example, the Wittgenstein quote occurs at point 4.012 of the Tractatus.   
xv For example, we are looking for the one quote where Wittgenstein states that we perceive 
propositions as pictures.   
xvi Wilensky, U. (1999).  The code for the simulations is based on the tutorial models provided by 
NetLogo with minor modifications.  Code for the simulations is available on request. Note that 
Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) also use NetLogo in their simulations.   
xvii Or 'patches' in NetLogo terminology. 
xviii  The experiment for each group size was run ten times, and the results reported are the average 
proportion of the locations visited. 
xix In the simulation code, a location (or ‘patch’) has a 5% chance of turning from grey to black when 
visited by an agent, indicating that there is a 5% chance that any agent visiting the location will 
recognise the object there.   
xx In a judgement aggregation framework, ‘competence’ is the probability an agent will vote for the 
correct alternative.  In a spatial search procedure, ‘competence’ is the probability an agent moves to the 
location containing the object of search.  In a search recognition procedure, ‘competence’ is the 
probability an agent recognises the object, given the agent moves to the location of the object.   
xxi Grofman, Owen and Feld (1983) Theorem I. 
xxii I am grateful to the anonymous referee for making this particular suggestion. 
xxiii See also Dietrich and Spiekermann (unpublished a, b), 
